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Muslims And Sikhs Need Not Apply
Muslims And Sikhs Need Not Apply
You can blame all of India's intelligence fiascos mainly on Hindus, as the agencies don't find Muslims or Sikhs fit to work for them.
SAIKAT DATTA
Noted educationist and former parliamentarian Humayun Kabir was known, among other things, for being a prominent Bengali politician who did not subscribe to the Muslim League’s vision of Pakistan. Instead, he chose secular India, rose to be the education secretary. Little did Kabir know that nearly fifty years later, one of his grandsons would not be inducted into RAW, India’s external intelligence agency. Reason: he was a Muslim.
The year was 2000. The NDA government was restructuring the Indian security apparatus following the Kargil war. Kabir’s grandson had been cleared for induction into the RAW’s air wing, the aviation research centre (ARC). He was found to be competent for the job and met all the required parameters. His interviewers were very impressed with him. They had no doubt that they had found their man.
But hours later the decision was reversed. The members of the selection board came to the view that there was a question mark on Kabir’s suitability for the job. He was a Muslim and the unwritten code within the agency was that Muslims could not be inducted it. That code vis-a-vis Muslims is still followed. From 1969 till today�RAW’s current staff strength is about 10,000�it has avoided recruiting any Muslim officer. Neither has the National Technical Research Organisation (NTRO), a crucial arm of external intelligence. The Intelligence Bureau (IB) with 12,000 personnel has been a little more open. It has a handful of Muslim officers, the senior-most is a joint director.
Many intelligence officials say keeping Muslims out or minimally represented is unwise. Post-9/11 the Indian intelligence community has been tasked to keep its eyes and ears open to global Islamic terrorism. It is here that the presence of dedicated Muslim officers will add to the expertise and capabilities that an organisation like RAW requires. But, senior officers are quick to point out that this should be done not to appease the community. "We have to realise that by following the unwritten code we are denying a pool of talent that is readily available. We need bright, dynamic, intelligent operatives. Should we deny them an opportunity just because they are Muslims?" asks a senior official.
According to former RAW chief A.S. Dulat, appointing Muslims is not only necessary but also critical. He feels that only a Muslim is capable of understanding the psyche of the community. Says Dulat: "The Muslim psyche can be baffling to non-Muslims. However much a person claims to be in tune with what the community feels, he can never really know all the nuances. A Muslim, on the other hand, would have the feel for the language, the metaphor and the culture. If you have to know what is happening in Aligarh Muslim University or SIMI, a Muslim will be much better informed. And you cannot wish away the feeling of neglect, the hurt and the discrimination that the community feels. That too is something a Muslim would be able to understand better."
Similarly, while dealing with intelligence inputs from Pakistan and Bangladesh, a Muslim could be far more effective. But officials point out that appointments should not label Muslim officers as Pakistani specialists. As Indians, their expertise can be deployed elsewhere too. The point they make is that efficient and qualified candidates should not be barred because of their religious identity.
As opposed to RAW, the IB, tasked with internal security, took a decision during the Narasimha Rao government to induct Muslim officers. Soon a couple of young IPS officers were taken in�one from the Uttar Pradesh cadre became the first inductees into the IB. Since then a few more appointments have taken place. According to official feedback, the performance of Muslim officers has never been under question.In fact, some of them went on to hold senior positions and one officer has risen to the rank of joint director presently handling a sensitive unit.
"There was some discussion within the IB before the doors were thrown open. The bottomline for us was that only merit would be the criterion. As intelligence officials our backgrounds are checked periodically. It applies to everyone irrespective of religious or ethnic identities," a senior official told Outlook. Some of the Muslim officers proved to be a big asset in several anti-insurgency operations in J&K. "They could identify with the sensibilities of the Kashmiris and were much more sensitive in their approach which paid off in 1994-95 when militancy was at its height. In fact, these officers helped us counter the Pakistani propaganda that was dominant in the Kashmir valley during that time," he adds.
Now several RAW officials agree a lack of Muslims in the organisation has created a void. They say a large part of India’s strategic outlook covers countries in the Middle East and the Gulf which are primarily Islamic. "These have been traditionally weak areas for us and the induction of Muslim officers could help us. But, we have to also side-step the narrow vision of hiring Muslims in Islamic states and just look at them as professionals," an official told Outlook.
Things could change if the present RAW chief, P.K. Hormese Tharakan, can push the case for a review of the recruitment policy. He has already embarked on an exercise to recruit talented manpower irrespective of religious or ethnic identity. A senior retired naval admiral has been hired as a consultant for this task. However, a final decision on any change in the present position has to come from the government.
Soon after the task force on intelligence submitted its report to the NDA government in 2000, it began an exercise to revamp intelligence agencies. While new organisations were being set up, a senior bureaucrat approached the then national security advisor (NSA) Brajesh Mishra for guidance. "I asked him if we could induct Muslims into the organisations that were being set up. He promised us that he would look into it. I never heard from him after that," he told Outlook.
The matter was taken up once again when J.N. Dixit took over as the NSA in the UPA government. Points out a bureaucrat: "He heard us out and gave instructions that there should be no discrimination on the basis of religion while recruiting competent officers. Days later he passed away and the instructions were not recorded on file and did not become official policy. So things continue to be the way they were."
Recruiting Muslims into the intelligence agencies finds support from within the strategic community. Says Air Commodore Jasjit Singh, who was part of the committee set up to restructure Indian intelligence in 1998. "I would emphasise that religion must not be a criterion. We have had an eminent chief of air staff in Idrees Latif and Lt General Jameel was army commander of Eastern Command while Lt Gen Zaki was security advisor to the J&K government at a critical period of militancy in the early 1990s. India is a country of minorities, whether religious, ethnic, linguistic or caste. And this is the strength of the nation," Those who argue for an all-inclusive policy based on merit like to remind the sceptics that it was Sikh officers and men who finally rooted out militancy in Punjab. Is the ‘secular’ Indian state listening?
By Saikat Datta and Bhavna Vij-Aurora
magazine | Nov 13, 2006
Manmohan Singh Can't Have A Sikh Bodyguard
Or for that matter, a Muslim. The SPG, NSG don't hire them.
It is the unwritten rule that no official wants to talk about openly. Our secular democracy does not deploy Muslims or Sikhs to protect its VVIPs. While Muslims were always under suspicion, the Sikhs got blacklisted after Indira Gandhi’s assassination in 1984 by her personal bodyguards who were Sikh.
It is ironic that Prime Minister Manmohan Singh, a Sikh, has no brethren from his own community detailed in the security cordon around him. Officials of the Special Protection Group (SPG), established in 1984 for providing security to prime ministers, have ensured that neither Sikhs or Muslims are employed as bodyguards to VVIPs .
Sources in the security set-up confirm there exists an unwritten code which is complied with diligently. Points out an official: "When it comes to VVIP security, we cannot take any chances, especially since the country has lost two of its prime ministers to brutal killings. Proximate security is the last defence, and if that is weak, how can we ensure safety of the person we’ve to protect?"
As far as Sikhs go, Indira Gandhi’s killing and militancy in Punjab put an end to them being recruited as securitymen. Much has changed since then but the community continues to be on the blacklist. Notes a senior official in the security set-up: "It has become an established thing. To change it, someone will have stick his neck out. And if something goes wrong he will have to answer for it. Nobody is willing to take any chances." The same line of thinking holds true for Muslims. As long as terrorism from across the border does not cease, members of the community will be under a cloud. Home ministry officials say with terror strikes across the country being linked to Islamic terrorism it would be a " big risk" to put a Muslim on VVIP security.
However, since no government organisation can bar persons of any particular community the SPG does employ a few Muslims and Sikhs. But they are kept off personal security. Reveals an official: "A 3000-strong organisation like the SPG does have Muslims and Sikhs. But we ensure that they are not deployed in sensitive posts. They are posted in the administration or intelligence"
The situation is not very different in the National Security Guard (NSG)�the other force which provides security to vips. The NSG was set up in 1984 after Operation Bluestar when the Indian army stormed the Golden Temple to flush out Sikh militants. The need was felt for creating a special force to conduct counter-terrorist operations with greater efficiency. The NSG was first deployed to combat insurgency in Punjab. But it evolved into an anti-terrorist unit with operations in J&K and other parts of the country. And it does not have any Sikh or Muslim as bodyguards.
Over the years, its elite Black Cat commandos have also been saddled with providing security to VVIPs, other than prime ministers (present and former) and their kin. They include political leaders like former deputy PM L.K. Advani, UP CM Mulayam Singh Yadav, BSP chief Mayawati and former Tamil Nadu CM J. Jayalalitha. But none of them will be a Sikh or a Muslim.
magazine | Nov 13, 2006
There Are No Secrets Here
No wonder our intelligence-gathering is so abysmal. There's no coordination between the agencies, there's red tape....
A high-profile meeting held at the Prime Minister's Office in late 2005 was revealing. It brought to the fore what ails Indian intelligence. The principal players of the intelligence community, senior officials from the IB, RAW and the National Technical Research Organisation (NTRO), were all present at that meeting, which was chaired by the National Security Advisor (NSA), M.K. Narayanan.
On top of the agenda was the need to put in place a network that would help crack intercepts between terrorist cells using a new and advanced communications network. NTRO officials put it on the table that they had a plan ready and that they had been developing or acquiring technical equipment to this end. This was in their purview as mandated by the Group of Ministers set up after the Kargil war. However, about then the IB representatives present interjected and pointed out that interception was in their jurisdiction.
The NSA, an ex-Intelligence Bureau director himself, also weighed in saying this ought to be the IB's task. The NTRO officials held their ground, stating that if this was so, instructions must be issued in writing. "We were clear that if this was not put down in writing, in the event of an intelligence failure we would be the likely scapegoat," an official in the know of what transpired at the meeting told Outlook. Despite being a task force member on intelligence, Narayanan had executed a volte-face that left NTRO officials stunned. "The NTRO was set up to be the nodal agency for all technical intelligence on the recommendations of the task force. But the NSA said the task should go to the IB. He even issued instructions that the "order be recorded in writing". The net result of all that bickering�no new system has been put in place till now.
This is typical of how the turf war between different arms of the Indian intelligence apparatus has severely hampered operations in recent times. Senior officials are unanimous on this point: different agencies pulling in different directions does not help when coordinated action is the need of the hour. Add to that systemic failures and you have a recipe for faulty or inadequate intelligence. Sample this:
* When investigators were burrowing through mountains of data after the Mumbai blasts, they did not have a centralised databank to fall back on. The Multi-Agency Centre (MAC) set up for this five years ago is still not fully operational.
* Technical coverage of neighbouring countries, the mainstay of Indian intelligence capabilities, has been steadily whittled down due to lack of adequate equipment and technology. A programme mooted in 1998 is yet to take off.
* A '98 proposal to set up dedicated think-tanks in the ministries of home, defence, external affairs and finance still hasn't happened.
* The National Security Council Secretariat (NSCS), responsible for collating and processing intelligence, has been headless for nearly a year.
* Joint Intelligence Committee (JIC), which merged with the NSCS in 1998, has been separated again. A retired official has been chosen to head the JIC. The demerger has achieved precious little.
* There have been very few meetings of the Strategic Policy Group, Intelligence Coordination Group and Technical Coordination Group, all set up to monitor the quality of intelligence.
* There is poor coordination with intelligence agencies abroad. Files relating to several key operations have not been cleared for months.
* Little or no attention is being paid to key wings such as the Aviation Research Centre (ARC). Forty per cent of its aircraft are currently inoperable.
* There is disproportionate focus on political intelligence rather than internal security.
* Lack of financial auditing has resulted in massive, unaccounted spending with few results to justify the cash outflow.
Since February this year, intelligence agencies have been waiting for the government to clear a draft legislation giving them legal teeth to go 'hacking' when national security is involved. "Terrorists are increasingly tech-savvy...we've been waiting for years for a comprehensive IT policy which clears legal hurdles if the agencies have to hack into computers. The law ministry is still sitting on the draft legislation," says an official.
To be fair, despite its limited resources and focus on political intelligence, the IB has managed to produce results. Sources say that pinpoint intelligence in the Kashmir Valley this year has helped neutralise nearly 70 LeT divisional commanders. "Terrorists are now afraid to designate anyone as a commander. They are scared," an IB official told Outlook. But officials are quick to point out that the success is more due to motivated, competent officers rather than any institutionalised mechanism. The fact is that manpower policies need to be updated quickly. In fact, the IB faced a spot of embarrassment when they tried to retain Francis Aranha, a 1984 batch IPS officer who wanted join the International Monetary Fund. Aranha, considered a promising officer, was a classic case of a talented officer getting frustrated within the system.
Home ministry sources point out that while the MAC is yet to take off, there has also been little progress with the Joint Task Force on intelligence. Set up to improve coordination between the states and the central intelligence agencies, there has been virtually no sharing of information. At a meeting of the Intelligence Coordination Group, the IB and RAW refused to set up a centralised databank of information. "Officials were insistent that the sharing would be only on a case-by case basis."
But the biggest failure, insist security experts, is at the level of governance. "Nearly 95 per cent of your intelligence is from public sources. But do we have a mechanism to analyse it and then separate the chaff from the grain? How do we identify what is operational and what is not?" asks Air Commodore Jasjit Singh, who was part of a task force to restructure intelligence along with K.C. Pant and Jaswant Singh in 1998. "When we set up the NSCS, it had just 17 people with it. In the US, the NSCS had 650 to analyse and provide papers for useful inputs," he adds.
Agrees Ajit Doval, ex-IB director who's handled counter-insurgency ops from the Northeast to Punjab to Kashmir: "Terrorists will keep changing methodologies to avoid detection and to surprise us. Are we updating our intelligence doctrines adequately to address these new threats?" he asks. Even agencies like ARC, which were applauded for their inputs during the Kargil war, have been starved of funds. "Two out of the three Gulfstream aircraft are not functional. One was damaged during the Orissa cyclone and has since been inoperable. Our Mi-17 helicopters only fly an average of 8 hours a month when they should be logging at least 25 hours. Not only is this a criminal waste, but also negligence," a senior official told Outlook.
So what is the government doing as India's security apparatus goes into a tailspin? Well, a simple episode may give us an idea: the Centre is yet to appoint a deputy NSA to head the crucial NSCS after Vijay Nambiar left, even though three seasons have passed. National security, it seems, is not really a matter of national concern.
magazine | Nov 13, 2006
"Need For Muslim Officers In Intelligence Gathering Is Acute"
The former secretary, RAW, who served as governor of J&K on the need to induct Muslims with merit and integrity into the intelligence agencies.
Girish Chandra Saxena was secretary, RAW, from 1983-1986. Later he served as governor of Jammu and Kashmir. He spoke to Bhavna Vij-Aurora on the need to induct Muslims with merit and integrity into our intelligence agencies. Excerpts:
Is it true that there are no Muslims in RAW?
The nature of intelligence work is such that nobody will ever give you an authentic answer on how many Muslims an agency like RAW has or if there are any at all.
But given the fact that we deal with countries like Bangladesh and Pakistan, do you think it makes sense to have Muslims in intelligence agencies?
Of course. The need for Muslim officers in intelligence-gathering is acute. They are a very precious commodity. There are lots of problems involved since these target countries have various religious denominations about which we must have an understanding. The agency is not getting people who speak different languages. There are very few people who have knowledge of Urdu or Arabic. The issue needs to be addressed. Also, any intelligence outfit should reach out to the best available talent. Sustained and serious effort has to be made to get people from all communities into it.
If the need is so great, then why do you think no effort is being made?
I will blame it on inertia since the tradition has been long established. It is not any feeling that Muslims have to be kept out. The factor of religious ethnicity is there and cannot be wished away but the nation has to rise above it. Allowance has to be made for the fact that some amount of ethnic sympathy is bound to be there. I am not talking of trust or distrust here.
The bottomline in the field of intelligence is nobody is distrusted but nobody is above suspicion either. This applies to everyone, not just Muslims. It is not easy work, not a game being played. It is serious business. There are too many restrictions. There is a certain discipline and a lot of inflexible commitments that a person has to accept without questioning. So there are problems on the other side too.
You mean even Muslims have reservations about joining RAW?
Yes. There is family pressure. In many cases, an agent could be working against a country which may be to our interest, but where he could have relatives. There is pressure on officers to quit and that can adversely affect their working.
I understand you had made some attempts to recruit Muslims in RAW?
I had come from the field and knew some Muslims who were very good and I could persuade them to join me. But during my time, it was not a simple thing. In those days, a person was not expected to disclose that he was working for RAW. The principle is still the same today. But one cannot expect that officers will not take even their immediate families into confidence. Even they have to be comfortable doing intelligence work.
Source:
Outlook magazine | Nov 13, 2006
